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Commentary
German Corporate Culture in the Twenty-
First Century: The Interrelation Between
the End of Germany, Inc. and Germany's
Corporate Capital Gains Tax Reform
Benjamin W. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
From 1945 until 1989, the world operated in two distinct
economic spheres: the Soviet controlled economies and the
United States and its allies.' In 1989, the governments of the
Soviet bloc began collapsing and the wall dividing the two
worlds crumbled. During the 1990's, Europe's economic growth
was impressive considering the integration of the two distinct
economic systems of the capitalist West and the communist
East. Currently, the merging of the Eastern European econo-
mies into the larger Western European market is not complete,
but the countries have taken Herculean steps in this unprece-
dented effort.
Germany's economy best exemplifies the new unification
among European economics at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Germans have had to deal with staggering reunifica-
tion costs associated with folding the German Democratic Un-
ion's (East German) economy into the Federal Republic of Ger-
many's (West German) economy. Although the Germans have
* Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney LLP; Admitted to practice, Minnesota and
Montana; J.D., 2000, University of Minnesota; B.A., 1997, Montana State Univer-
sity-Bozeman.
1. See generally WERNER MEYER-LARSEN, GERMANY, INC.: THE NEW GERMAN
JUGGERNAUT AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WORLD BUSINESS, at v-xii (2000) (examining
the history of large corporations in Germany since World War II and how Germany
has developed one of the strongest corporate structures in the World).
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dealt with a myriad of reunification problems, they have also
helped lead the charge in strengthening the European Monetary
Union and initiating the European Common Currency (the
euro).
Amazingly, with all of the internal upheaval surrounding
German reunification, Germany's large corporations became
even stronger in the 1990's. "Germany, Inc.," as the large Ger-
man corporations are collectively called, is in a very strong posi-
tion at the beginning of the new century.2 Even with its strong
position, Germany, Inc. must still make additional changes to
improve its standing in the world economy. Germany, Inc. must
change because too much of corporate Germany's capital is tied
up in ownership of other German corporations. 3 These corpora-
tions must diversify into other business areas and other mar-
ketplaces, such as the United States, to compete in the global
economy. The German government must help Germany, Inc.
unwind its gigantic cross-holdings without too much interfer-
ence. Germany's Chancellor Schroeder gave this process a big
boost when he traded government subsidies for projects in cer-
tain legislative districts to win passage of his tax reform bill
during the 2000 legislative session.4 The Chancellor secured the
votes of key members of the legislature by promising large
amounts of direct governmental aid to various districts within
Germany. 5
Changes to Germany, Inc. have been greatly accelerated by
Chancellor Schroeder's proposed tax reform that affects corpo-
rate transactions involving Germany, Inc. This Commentary
begins with a discussion and description of Germany, Inc.'s
make-up and the reaction of its members to Chancellor Schroe-
2. See id. at 3-6.
3. Review & Outlook,, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 28, 1999, at 6; see also MEYER-
LARSEN, supra note 1, at 30-31.
4. Christopher Rhoads, Tax Breakthrough in Germany Opens Window of Op-
portunity: Change is Expected to Unleash a Wave of Divestures, Spin-Offs and Acqui-
sitions: Bill Looked Dead, but Pork-Barrel Spending Revived It, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
July 17, 2000, at 1 (discussing how Chancellor Schroeder handed out monies to aid
the districts of key legislators in a successful effort to win their votes on the tax re-
form measure); see also CNNFN, German Tax Reform Stalls: Bank-Friendly Plan to
Cut Capital Gains Tax Hits Political Snag, at http'//cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/07/03/
europe/germanytax/ (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Stalls] (discussing the expected de-
lay of the tax reform); CNNFN, Germany Passes Tax Reform: Vote Clear Way for Big
Cuts in Company Taxes; Financial Stocks Soar, at http://cnnfu.cnn.com/2000/
07/14/europe/germanytax (July 14, 2000) [hereinafter Vote Clears](discussing the
recent passage of the tax reform).
5. Rhoads, supra note 4, at 1.
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der's surprise tax reform proposal. Next, this Commentary will
discuss three deals that exemplify the possibilities and problems
of the future of corporate Germany: Daimler-Benz's merger with
Chrysler Corporation; the successful takeover battle by British
telecommunications giant Vodafone AirTouch PLC (hereinafter
"Vodafone") for control of German telecommunications and in-
dustrial behemoth Mannesmann AGC (hereinafter "Mannes-
man") in early 2000; and the aborted merger attempt between
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, two of Germany's largest
banks. The above transactions will be examined to demonstrate
how Germany, Inc.'s members are being forced to change by
adopting more aggressive growth targets and shifting their fo-
cus to increasing shareholder value. Lastly, this Commentary
will analyze the recently announced merger of Allianz and
Dresdner Bank as an example of the impending wave of mergers
and acquisitions that will increasingly occur as a result of Ger-
many's repeal of its corporate capital gains tax.
I. GERMANY, INC.-ITS COMPOSITION AND A
SURPRISING TAX REFORM PROPOSAL
A. GERMAN CORPORATION CROSS-OWNERSHIP
After World War II, German banking and insurance indus-
tries slowly became intertwined with other corporations in
Germany through cross-ownership. 6 The German government
encouraged this interlocking of companies because it helped re-
build the shattered West German economy.7 The amount of the
cross-ownership of large German corporations is staggering. Es-
timates place German cross-ownership at possibly more than
250 billion euros (228 billion U.S. dollars8), or fifteen percent of
Germany's 1.5 trillion euro stock market capitalization.9 Even
6. Dagman Aalund and Brian Coleman, Deutsche Bank Plan May Shake Ger-
many: Spinoff of Holdings Could Be Precursor to Sales of Stakes, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Dec. 16, 1998, at 13.
7. Id.
8. All conversions into U.S. currency were completed September 8, 2001.
9. Vanessa Fuhrmans, European Country Factors Continue to Influence In-
vestment Strategy: National Developments Give Sectoral-Based Trend Some Compe-
tition: German Tax Reform 'Makes a Good Case for Balancing', WALL ST. J. EUR.,
August 7, 2000, at 11; Christopher Rhoads, 'The Big Bang:' Simple Tax Proposal
Promises to Light a Rocket in Germany: Eliminating Levy on Shares Held by Firms
to Give Major Push to Reform: Setting Free 250 Billion Euros, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan.
31, 2000, at 1.
20021
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
now, before the tax repeal is fully effective, fierce corporate
competitors often own large chunks of each other and have
members on each other's supervisory boards (the equivalent of
an American board of directors). 10 In the past, because of the
large cross-ownership between German corporations, the man-
agers of many of these enterprises have not had to worry about
increasing individual shareholder value because each company's
management was only required to please their large institu-
tional shareholders." The large cross-ownership also shielded
many companies from hostile takeovers because a large number
of corporate executives sat on each other's supervisory boards,
but shareholders are now demanding more power. 12
Corporate Germany is currently handcuffed by its owner-
ship structure, the crux of which is its pervasive cross-holdings.
For example, Munich Re owns stakes in more than 30 German
corporations.13 Although it is the biggest reinsurer in the world,
Munich Re does not make a move without consulting its largest
outside shareholder, its fierce rival Allianz, who owns 25 per-
cent of Munich Re. 14 Allianz and Deutsche Bank's stakes in
other large German corporations, if combined, have been esti-
mated to be at least 65 billion euros (59 billion U.S. dollars) on
January 31, 2000.15 In 1994, Deutsche Bank alone held over
100 seats on the supervisory boards of other large German cor-
porations, which it used to watch its investments closely. 16 The
following is a listing of some of the cross-ownership by the larg-
est members of Germany, Inc. as of January 31, 2000 and the
estimated market value of those holdings in American dollars. 7
10. See William Boston, Gantam Naik and Anita Raghavan, Down to the Wire:
Gent and Esser Strike Deal for Vodafone to Buy Mannesmann: Record 181.4 Billion
Euros Accord Creates Wireless Giant After Bruising: All Eyes on Mobile Phones,
WALL ST. J. EuR., Feb. 4, 2000, at 1.
11. See Thomas Kamm, Continental Drift: Europe Marks a Year of Serious Flir-
tation With the Free Market: Big Steps Forward and Back Shows Uneven Evolution
Under Global Pressures: Germany's Culture Concerns, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 30,
1999, at 1.
12. See David Woodrudd, German Showdown: Under Siege: Germany, Inc.
Model of Postwar Prosperity Begins to Unravel, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1.
13. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Munich Re is Relieved Merger Mania is Over: Deal's
Collapse Ends Pressure to Link Up, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 14, 2000, at 15.
14. Id.
15. Christopher Rhoads, German Markets Gear Up For 'Big Bang' if Tax Law
Passes, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A24.
16. See David Duffy and Lachlan Murray, Germany's Disclosure Dilemma,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 24, 1994, at 10.
17. Rhoads, supra note 15, at A24.
[Vo111:69
GERMANY'S CAPITAL GAINS TAX REFORM
Stock Ownership Percentage Dollar Amount in
Billions
Allianz
Munich Re 25% $10.38
Dresdner Bank 21.4 5.44
BASF 10.4 3.06
Veba 10.1 2.37
Beiersdorf 38.4 2.27
RWE 10.1 1.78
Linde 11 0.69
Munich Re
Allianz 25% $19.37
Hypo Vereinsbank 6.5 1.29
Deutsche Bank
Munich Re 10% $9.29
DaimlerChyrsler 12 8.40
Allianz 7.3 5.34
Linde 10.1 0.50
Heidelberger Zement 10.1 0.40
HypoVerseinsbank
Munich Re 13.3% $6.13
Allianz 6.8 5.44
Viag 10.3 1.29
Brau und Brunner 55.2 0.10
Dresdner Bank
Allianz 10% $8.00
Munich Re 10 4.65
BMW 5 0.89
Heidelberger Zement 20.8 0.69
German banks and insurers took stakes in other German
corporations either because the government granted loans to the
corporations who did so or as payment for loans to corporations
that could not raise capital.'8 An example of this government
inducement occurred during the 1970s when Deutsche Bank
purchased Daimler-Benz stock to maintain German ownership
18. Aalund and Coleman, supra note 6, at 13.
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of the automaker. During that time the Royal family of Kuwait
already owned 16.5 percent of Daimler-Benz and the Shah of
Iran hoped to purchase a major portion of the company. 19 If the
Shah had succeeded in completing his purchase of Daimler
stock, control of Daimler-Benz would have left Germany.
Deutsche Bank's actions kept the automaker safely in German
hands.20 Since its purchase of Daimler-Benz stock, Deutsche
Bank has been hesitant to sell its longstanding holding in the
carmaker because of the onerous corporate capital gains tax in
Germany. 21 Until the repeal of this tax is effective, the corpo-
rate capital gain tax rate is approximately 50 percent. 22
B. REPEAL OF THE CORPORATE CAPITAL GAINS TAX
In late 1998, Deutsche Bank spun its holdings in the mem-
bers of Germany, Inc. into a newly formed subsidiary named DB
Investors. 23 At the time of the creation of DB Investors, the
press reported that Deutsche Bank created the subsidiary to di-
vest the bank's holdings in Germany, Inc.24 Deutsche Bank's
creation of DB Investors was well received in the business world
and Deutsche Bank's stock jumped seven percent. 25 It was
thought that without DB Investors, the slow-growing cross-
ownership investments in the other companies of Germany, Inc.
would still be on Deutsche Bank's books years later.26 Without
the investments in other members of Germany, Inc., Deutsche
Bank's balance sheet can grow at a much faster pace.
In October 1999, through its use of DB Investors, Deutsche
Bank took the first step in divesting itself of its Germany, Inc.
holdings. On October 28, 1999, Deutsche Bank sold twenty-
three percent of its multi-billion euro stake in Allianz, another
member of Germany, Inc.27 The transaction was the first for DB
19. MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 56.
20. Id. at 55-57.
21. Aalund and Coleman, supra note 6, at 13.
22. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Allianz Seeks to Shed Dresdner Stake, Top Executive
Says, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 13, 2000, at 1.
23. Rhoads, supra note 9, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Aalund and Coleman, supra note 6, at 13.
26. See id.; see also CNNFN, Deutsche Sells $1.5B Stake: Allianz Shares Sold,
More Asset Sales From Deutsche Bank Likely (October 29, 1999), at
http://cnnfn.cnn.com/1999/10/29/europe/deutsche-allianz/ (discussing Deutsche
Bank's sale of Allianz shares).
27. Silvia Ascarelli, Deutsche Bank Sells Big Chunk of Allianz Shares, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Oct. 29, 1999, at 17.
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Investors and was valued at nearly 1.4 billion euros (1.28 billion
U.S. dollars).28 Deutsche Bank sold five million shares to "in-
ternational investors" at 275 euros (251 U.S. dollars) a share on
October 28, 1999, or a 5.2 percent discount on Allianz's closing
price of 290.1 euros (265 U.S. dollars) on October 28, 1999.29
Analysts estimated that the transaction generated a capital
gain of more than 1 billion euros (912 million U.S. dollars) and
was completed in spite of a punishing capital gains tax of more
than 50 percent. 30
Unfortunately for Deutsche Bank, it could not have sold its
stake in Allianz at a worse time. In December 1999, in a move
that shocked everyone involved in the German equity markets,
and was beyond anything that corporate Germany could have
ever hoped for, Chancellor Schroeder proposed eliminating the
corporate capital gains tax on German corporations as part of a
tax reform bill.31 The Chancellor's move was an abrupt about
face from his previous protectionism rhetoric.32 Just months
earlier, Chancellor Schroeder, when discussing the takeover at-
tempt by Vodafone of Mannesmann, stated, "Hostile takeovers
destroy corporate culture. '33 Chancellor Schroeder had also per-
sonally led a bailout of the large German construction firm
Holzmann a few days after his comments on hostile takeovers. 34
Chancellor Schroeder must have realized that eliminating the
corporate capital gains tax would make many German corpora-
tions the subject of takeover attempts because large chunks of
their stock will now be for sale. Located in what appeared to be
a minor clause in the back of the tax reform bill, the unexpected
corporate tax reform was not discovered by the market until two
days after it was made. 35
After the discovery of the corporate capital gains repeal in
the tax reform bill, the chairman of the supervisory board of
Deutsche Bank, Hilmar Kopper, was quoted as saying, "I was
not expecting this at all ... I've been talking about this for the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Kamm, supra note 11, at 1; see also Review & Outlook, supra note 3, at
6.
32. Kamm, supra note 11, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Wilfried Prewo, The End of Germany, Inc., WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 29, 1999,
at 10.
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last five years and there's been no reaction."36 Deutsche Bank's
action selling part of its stake in Allianz two months prior to the
tax return demonstrated that the bank was caught off-guard by
Chancellor Schroeder's proposal. 37 One top German executive
likened the tax reform to "Germany's big bang".38 Chancellor
Schroeder's tax relief proposal is also widely seen as being a
boost to the restructuring of the German economy and to share-
holder driven values. 39
Chancellor Schroeder was successful in repealing the oner-
ous fifty percent capital gains tax, but not until he gave key
members of the German legislature monies for programs in
their districts.40 To gain passage of the tax reform, Chancellor
Schroeder traded government subsidies for votes. Until just be-
fore the tax reform legislation passed, and after it had been re-
jected in an earlier vote, the proposal seemed doomed.41 Last
minute revisions to the tax reform package and "federal aid" of
hundreds of million deutsche marks for other programs saved
the reform.42 The Christian Democrats, the conservative politi-
cal party in Germany, reversed their normal role of fighting for
larger businesses and refused to pass the tax reform bill unless
it included more provisions for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses.43 Another important change to the law, which helped
win its passage, delays the effective date of the corporate capital
gains repeal until January 2002.44 Surprisingly, Chancellor
Schroeder's proposal will probably be seen as a catalyst for the
future growth of the top German companies. 45
Commentators and economists predicted there would be
four major consequences to repealing the corporate capital gains
tax in Germany. 46 First, there will be a surge in mergers and
divestitures that will involve both foreign and German corpora-
tions.47 Second, German corporations will become more profit-
able since they will be able to allocate more of their capital to
36. Rhoads, supra note 15, at A24.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Rhoads, supra note 4, at 1.
41. See id.; see also Vote Clears, supra note 4.
42. Rhoads, supra note 4, at 1; see also Vote Clears, supra note 4.
43. Stalls, supra note 4.
44. Rhoads, supra note 4, at 1.
45. Prewo, supra note 35, at 10.
46. Rhoads, supra note 15, at A24.
47. Id.
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core businesses. 48 Third, more shares will become available to
individual investors and, therefore, shareholder culture will be-
come more important to German corporations. Finally, share-
holders will become more powerful and deepen the German
capital markets. 49
Proposing a tax reform package was a dramatic change for
the Social Democratic Party. In 1994, the SPD had advocated
forcing large German banks (i.e. Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank) to trim their industrial holdings despite the punitive cor-
porate capital gains tax.50 During the 1998 campaign, the Social
Democrats had also threatened to increase taxes on the sale of
corporate assets.51 During the first fifteen months in office, the
Social Democrats increased taxes, reversed reasonable labor and
pension reforms, and passed on an earlier prior change to make
a sweeping business tax reform.5 2
Protests against the corporate capital gains tax repeal from
the left side of the Social Democrats were silenced to gain pas-
sage of the tax reform package. Chancellor Schroeder now ap-
pears to have most of the Social Democrats behind the tax re-
forms.5 3 The initial reaction to the tax reform package by some
of the left-leaning Social Democrats was not positive. Two So-
cial Democrat members of the German Parliament were even
forced to retract public statements that they had made against
the proposal.54 Whereas some Social Democrats had originally
opposed the tax reform because they thought it would cause tax
shortfalls, the same politicians praised the move as leading to
"more growth and employment by creating more efficient corpo-
rate structures and facilitating investment in the German econ-
omy."55 The initial opponents to the repeal of the corporate capi-
tal gains tax failed to realize one crucial aspect of the high tax
rate: Germany's corporate capital gains tax was so onerous that
it made it too expensive for German companies to sell their cor-
porate cross-holdings. The tax effectively generated very little
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Deutsche Bank is Wary of Stake-Paring, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 8, 1994,
at 25.
51. Dieter Fockenbrock, Germany's M & A Activity Slowed in 1999, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Jan. 19, 2000, at 13.
52. Prewo, supra note 35.
53. Cecilie Rohwedder, Key German Party Backs Plan to Drop Capital-Gains
Tax, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1999, at All.
54. See Cecilie Rohwedder, Schroeder's Tax-Cut Plan Gains Support: Social
Democrats Reverse Earlier Opposition, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 29, 1999, at 2.
55. Id.
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revenue because its punitive nature essentially prohibited cor-
porations from selling their stakes in other companies. 56 Even
the one billion dollars generated by DB Investors' sale of Allianz
stock is a small amount in the scheme of German taxation. The
Social Democrats who had opposed the reform acknowledged in
their retraction of earlier critical comments that Germany was
not gaining any tax revenues from its corporate capital gains
tax.5
7
Christian Democrats could not put up much of a fight
against the corporate capital gains repeal contained in Chancel-
lor Schroeder's tax reform package because they could not be
seen as blocking a proposal that would bring foreign investment
to Germany. 8 The Christian Democrats extracted some conces-
sions during the passing of the larger tax reform legislation, but
the Christian Democrats were unsuccessftil in preventing final
passage of the much needed tax reform bill.59 In fact, the Chris-
tian Democrats' initial opposition was little more than the ex-
pected perftnctory opposition to any Social Democrat proposal.60
This tax reform is seen as a major step in overhauling the Ger-
man economy, and the Christian Democrats could not be per-
ceived as trying to stop such an important economic reform.61
Christian Democrats would not want to be seen as opposing a
measure that has the potential to attract foreign investment,
stimulate economic growth, and break up the holdings of Ger-
many, Inc.62
II. THREE DEALS THAT PROVIDE A ROAD MAP TO THE
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE FUTURE
A. OVERVIEW
1. DaimlerChrysler: The Trailblazer
The $38 billion merger between Daimler-Benz and the
Chrysler Corporation characterized by DaimlerChrysler's larg-
56. See id.; see also Rohwedder, supra note 54.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Rhoads, supra note 4.
60. See Rohwedder, supra note 54.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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est American shareholder as a takeover disguised as a merger
by the Germans 63 was the largest merger in Germany when it
was announced in 1998.64 Daimler-Benz's bold move provides a
guide for the mechanics of such a transaction for the other
members of Germany Inc. as they attempt to extend their hold-
ings to the United States. Under the leadership of Jurgenn
Schrempp, Daimler-Benz remade itself during the mid-1990s
and boosted shareholder value.65 Moreover, Daimler-Benz listed
itself on the New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter "NYSE").66
When investors drove up Daimler-Benz's share price, the com-
pany had the capital it needed to merge with Chrysler Corpora-
tion and control the transaction. 67
2. Vodafone: A Rare Hostile Takeover on German Soil
Mannesmann, a German industrial and telecommunica-
tions giant, recently agreed to a takeover by Vodafone, a British
communications behemoth, after a protracted takeover battle.6
Mannemann's unsuccessful and unassisted attempt to fend off
Vodafone's hostile takeover bid exemplifies the new German
corporate culture. The Vodafone hostile takeover was the first
such acquisition of a large Germany company in recent history,
with Mannesmann's board agreeing to the most expensive ac-
quisition in corporate history, much larger than the Daimler-
Chrysler merger.69
3. Dresdner Bank: The Perils of the Emerging Market for
German Corporate Executives.
In the Spring of 2000, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank
announced a merger and then aborted the discussions after a
month of deadlocked talks.70 The impasse was primarily caused
63. See Tough Road for Kerkorian: Daimler Says $8 Billion Suit Has No Merit
While Legal Experts Call it a Long Shot (analyzing Kerkorian's Tracinda Corp's law
suit alleging that Tracinda Corp. and other investors were fraudulently lured into
agreeing to the $38 billion merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corp.) [hereinafter
Kerkorian] (Nov. 28, 2000), available at http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/l1/28/
worldbiz/kerkorianlindex.htm.
64. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 3; see also Kerkorian, supra note 63.
65. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 22.
66. See Duffy and Murray, supra note 16.
67. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 22.
68. See Boston, Naik and Raghavan, supra note 10.
69. See Boston, Naik, and Raghavan, supra note 10.
70. Christopher Rhoads and Erik Portanger, Dresdner, Deutsche Bank Deal
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by a disagreement over whether to sell Dresdner Bank's Lon-
don-based investment banking operation Dresdner Kleinwort
Benson (DKB), now Dresdner Kleinwort Wassertein. The fall-
out from the failed merger was substantial, with Dresdner
Bank's Chairman and three members of his management board
resigning, and calls for the Deutsche Bank Chairman to leave.71
The aborted deal between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank is a precursor of impending tough deals for German com-
panies. Future deals will become increasingly complex and ad-
versarial.72 The traditional German way of only analyzing cor-
porate transactions in the boardroom has become obsolete, and
is being replaced by merger and acquisition strategies similar to
those in the United States. Shareholder value and the value of
the parts of each corporation will drive acquisitions in the fu-
ture, not the value and prestige of the whole company and the
wishes of only the Germany, Inc. shareholders. Executives from
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank learned this lesson quickly
after they called off their merger.73 Fallout from the aborted
bank merger began almost immediately with the resignation of
the Dresdner Bank Chairman. 74 Furthermore, there has been a
call for the resignation of the Chairman of Deutsche Bank, Rolf
Breuer, who until the aborted merger had been very well re-
ceived throughout the corporate and investment communities. 75
The staid corporate culture of Germany is about to end, and
deal-making will be fast and furious over the next few years.
Collapses Under Weight of Rift, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 6, 2000, at 1.
71. Erik Portanger and Deborah Steinborn, Three Members of Dresdner Board
Resign Their Jobs: Executives are Victims of Failed Merger Fallout, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Apr. 14, 2000, at 15; See also Christopher Rhoads and Erik Portanger,
Dresdner Chairman Quits, First Victim of Merger Fiasco [hereinafter Quit], WALL
ST. J. EuR., Apr. 7, 2000, at 1; see also Christopher Rhoads and Erik Portanger,
Failed Deal Leave Turmoil at Deutsche and Dresdner Banks [hereinafter Turmoil],
WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 10, 2000, at 1.
72. See The Urge to Merge: Bankers Uber Alles, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 17,
2000, at 10 (examining the future of mergers in Germany and Europe as a whole
while European economies undergo reform).
73. See Quit, supra note 71; see also Turmoil, supra note 71.
74. Quit, supra note 71.
75. See id.; see also Turmoil, supra note 71.
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B. THE DAIMLERCHRYSLER MERGER
1. Increasing International Presence
DaimlerChrysler's formation was the most public sign of
growing German influence in the world economy and an indica-
tion that the barriers between German and American companies
were beginning to fall. German companies had already taken
over some large American brand name companies, such as
Fireman's Fund Insurance,"6 but this was the most public dis-
play of a German company holding the upper hand in a large
transaction. Soon, another substantial merger occurred and a
German corporation was once again controlling the transaction.
On November 23, 1998, Deutsche Bank announced its takeover
of Banker's Trust, a New York financial institution, for ap-
proximately $9.2 billion in cash.77 While the DaimlerChrysler
merger used stock, the preferred "currency," to pay for the
merger, Deutsche Bank was forced to pay cash for Banker's
Trust because Deutsche Bank is not listed on a United States
stock exchange.78
Historically, Germany, Inc. has received the bulk of its
revenues from businesses inside German borders, contributing
to a corporate structure not conducive to having the proper cur-
rency, a NYSE or NASDAQ listing, and the ability to move nim-
bly in acquisitions in the United States. The Daimler-Benz
merger with Chrysler Corporation demonstrates the need for
large German corporations to have a NYSE or a NASDAQ list-
ing if they are going to purchase established American compa-
nies. In order to achieve an American stock exchange listing,
German companies must shift their focus from internal
strength, preservation of value, and behind the scenes deal-
making to increased revenues and shareholder value. It would
be a gross overstatement to say that the balance of power has
shifted or will shift from America to Germany, but the Germans
are gaining more than a mere foothold in major American busi-
ness, an inroad that must be taken seriously.
2. Gaining Exposure to the American Stock Markets: The
76. See generally Timothy Aeppel and Beatrice E. Garcia, Allianz to Buy Fire-
man's Fund for $1.1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1990, at A3.
77. MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 77.
78. See id., at 21.
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Required Currency to be a Big Player in America.
Even German companies with substantial capital reserves
must list their stocks on either the NYSE or NASDAQ if they
hope to become large players in the United States. With the
"currency" of U.S. listed stocks, German corporations will not be
forced to drain their capital reserves by acquiring U.S. corpora-
tions with cash, and will, therefore, expand more economically
and with greater ease in the United States.7 9 Strikingly, save
for the DaimlerChrysler merger, most large multi-billion dollar
German acquisitions in the United States have occurred with
cash because the Germans have not been able to use their stock
listed in other countries as currency for the transactions."0 The
DaimlerChrysler merger was the first very large German-
American combination that was able to use a stock for stock
trade because Daimler-Benz was listed on the NYSE.81
Many of the large German insurers and banks have been
hesitant to list their stocks on an American stock exchange.
Such a listing would require the German corporations to convert
to American accounting methods and consolidate the results of
their vast holdings in other companies into their own financial
statements.8 2 These insurers and banks originally took equity
in other German corporations as collateral for loans. 3 Now,
these equity stakes were increasingly regarded as a hindrance
to competitiveness and the growing shareholder value move-
ment.84  German corporations have also had problems buying
large American corporations because the German corporations
have been valued too low by the markets in comparison to their
American counterparts.8 5
One of the possible explanations for the low stock market
valuations of German corporations in comparison with their
American counterparts is the difference in stability between
German and American corporations. 6 The inner stability of the
German corporations has not been included in the economic
79. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Skandia Strives to List its Shares on NYSE: In-
surer Joins Its Peers in Drive to Expand in U.S., WALL ST. J. EuR., Feb. 17, 2000, at
27.
80. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 21.
81. See id.
82. See Duffy & Murray, supra note 16.
83. See Rhoads, supra note 4, at 1.
84. See id.
85. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 21-23.
86. See id.. at 21.
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valuation of these companies, whereas the entrepreneurial na-
ture of the American corporations is included 7 This inherent
stability in German corporations comes from the expensive
fringe benefits and the social security that the companies offer
their employees.88 .
Many German corporations of comparable size are valued at
substantially less than their American counterparts.8 9 On the
stock market, this disparity has meant that the return on reve-
nue for larger German corporations was lower than for their
American counterparts.90 A snapshot of comparable German
and American companies on any given day shows this unequal
treatment. For example, on September 23, 1998, Siemens cor-
poration was worth, according to its stock market valuation,
54.4 billion Deutsche marks (25.4 billion U.S. dollars) while
General Electric was valued at 441.8 billion dollars (947 billion
Deutsche marks).91 One commentator stated that this disparity
in market valuation was a joke because if the two companies
merged based on stock valuation Siemens would only be worth
approximately 11 percent of General Electric.92 This unequal
valuation arises even though a good argument can be made that
the companies, based upon their holdings, are of comparable
size. 93
3. Daimler-Benz and the NYSE: How Daimler-Benz Was Able to
Merge with Chrysler
The formation of DaimlerChrysler and its subsequent in-
ternal management decisions lend great insight into the differ-
ences between German and American corporate structures.
Long before the fall of the Berlin Wall and into the early 1990's,
Daimler-Benz was stagnating.94 Daimler-Benz's attempt to pro-
tect its core businesses while tepidly attempting diversification
into areas such as aerospace were not successful.95 Daimler-
Benz was so timid in its diversification attempts that it chose to
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id., at 21-23.
90. See id.
91. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 21-23.
92. See id. at 21.
93. See id.
94. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 63-68.
95. See id.
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expand only with the help of government subsidies.96 As a re-
sult of the government support, Daimler-Benz did not carefully
investigate prospective acquisitions, and it became dependent
on the government handouts.97 Daimler-Benz finally sold, at
major losses, most of its attempts to enter into other busi-
nesses.98
As mentioned previously, the Daimler-Benz merger with
Chrysler Corporation was a stock transaction. Daimler-Benz
could not have even contemplated merging with a company the
size of Chrysler without listing stock on the NYSE. Although
Edward Reuter, the former Chief Executive of Daimler-Benz,
had serious problems running Daimler, his decision to list
Daimler-Benz on the NYSE played a key role in the company's
later growth.99 After the NYSE listing, the performance of
Daimler-Benz could be directly compared to General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler because all of the automakers were now us-
ing the same accounting principles and filling the same Securi-
ties Exchange Commission ("SEC") reports. Aside from Mr.
Reuter's listing of Daimler-Benz on the NYSE, he gained a repu-
tation as the "worst squanderer of capital in the history of Ger-
man corporations" because of his failed attempts to diversify the
automaker. 100 Mr. Reuter's successor, Jurgenn Schrempp, ulti-
mately received credit for the introduction of Daimler-Benz to
Wall Street, though he did not wholly deserve this credit.101 Mr.
Schrempp was successful in increasing the market capitaliza-
tion of Daimler-Benz which gave the German automaker the
necessary leverage to merge eventually with an American part-
ner, but Mr. Schrempp was not the driving force behind the
company's original listing on the NYSE.
Daimler-Benz shocked corporate Germany by listing its
common stock on the NYSE.1 03 To obtain a listing on the NYSE,
Daimler-Benz had to change its accounting methods drastically
and report its results under the GAAP. 0 4 Daimler-Benz's
change to GAAP had a dramatic effect on how the company's
earnings were reported and, ultimately, made the company
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 66-67.
99. See id. at 22.
100. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 22.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Duffy & Murray, supra note 16.
104. See id.
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more accountable to its individual shareholders and less so to its
institutional shareholders. 10 5 The change from German account-
ing principles to GAAP was highlighted when Daimler-Benz
prepared its first-half 1993 results in preparation for listing on
the NYSE. Under German accounting rules, Daimler-Benz
would have been able to use its hidden capital reserves in re-
porting and would have shown a profit of $97 million (168 mil-
lion Deutsche marks). 10 6 Under the more conservative GAAP,
the automaker was forced to eliminate the impact of its hidden
reserves and instead showed a loss of $548.55 million (949 mil-
lion Deutsche marks.)10 7
In 1998, the value of Daimler-Benz's stock was usually
high, much like other German automakers, while the share
prices of its American counterparts were low. 08 Because of the
NYSE listing, Mr. Schrempp now had the requisite "currency"
he needed for a merger with an American counterpart. Daim-
ler-Benz's high valuation was one result of a plan to make the
German automaker leaner and more profitable so that it would
be better received in the American market. 10 9 Mr. Schrempp's
shareholder-value campaign was so successful that Daimler-
Benz had a higher market capitalization than Chrysler at the
time of the 1998 merger. 10 Daimler-Benz's strategy to drop
every business line that was in danger of losing money and con-
centrate on its primary luxury car and heavy truck business had
been a smashing success."'
What was reported as an "overnight deal" between Daimler-
Benz and Chrysler was anything but spontaneous for Mr.
Schrempp.112 Mr. Schrempp paved the way for a merger by
starting his search for a possible partner in 1997.113 After decid-
ing that Daimler-Benz would not benefit greatly in a merger
with a European partner, Mr. Schrempp turned his attention to
the "Big Three" in America-General Motors, Ford, and Chrys-
ler."4 Daimler-Benz management quickly eliminated General
Motors because of that company's massive internal restructur-
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 22.
109. See id. at 69.
110. See id. at 22.
111. See id. at 13.
112. See id. at 69.
113. See id. at 69.
114. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1.
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ing Daimler-Benz thought would not be completed until 2003 at
the earliest. 115 Ford was also quickly eliminated as a possibility
because Ford hoped to become the world's number one auto-
maker in sales and was not willing to merge with Daimler-Benz
on equal footing.116 In the end, Daimler-Benz was left with
Chrysler Corporation as its only potential American partner.
Most analysts at the time thought Chrysler Corporation
was an ideal merger partner for Daimler-Benz because both
companies had undergone many of the same internal reforms.
Chrysler had revamped its entire car line in recent years and
had recovered remarkably well from near bankruptcy in the
early 1980's. 117 A merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler
also made sense because there was little overlap in each com-
pany's strengths. Chrysler was a leader in the light truck mar-
ket and SUV market while Daimler-Benz led the heavy truck
market and the luxury car market.118
Once the initial concept of the DaimlerChrysler merger was
announced the real work began. The lawyers and management
for both sides worked hard to close the deal and within six
months the physical details of the merger were finalized. 1 9
Upon completion of the merger, the new company attempted the
complicated and difficult task of merging the German and
American corporate cultures, efforts that have not been wholly
successful. 120 There has been an exodus of top executives at
Chrysler as American executives have lost out behind closed
doors to their German counterparts. 121 The list of Chrysler ex-
ecutives that have left, either voluntarily or involuntarily, is
long and distinguished. Departed executives include: Robert
Eaton, CEO; Bob Lutz, president; Tom Gale, top designer; and
Jim Holden, who was hand-picked by Jurgenn Schrempp to
bridge the gap between management in the United States and
Germany. 122
Although the creation of DaimlerChrysler will probably
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 69-75.
118. See DaimlerChrysler: What Went Wrong? Two Years After Historic Merger,
Warning Lights Are Flashing at DaimlerChrysler (Dec. 27, 2000), available at
http://cnnfii.cnn.com/2000/12/27/europe/chrysler-outlook/ [hereinafter Daimler-
Chrysler] (examining the Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corporation merger after a
couple of years).
119. MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 3.
120. See id.
121. See DaimlerChrysler, supra note 118.
122. See id.
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prove to be successful over time, the company's fortunes have
been dismal since the completion of the merger. DaimlerChrys-
ler's stock has been in a steady decline since the merger, going
from a high of $108 a share in January 1999 after the merger to
43.16 euros (approximately $37.75) in December 2000.123 In
early 2001, DaimlerChrysler also announced layoffs of over
26,000 workers and other cost-cutting measures. 124 Moreover,
DaimlerChrysler is now defending a string of lawsuits started
by its largest U.S. shareholder, Kirk Kerkorian.125 Mr. Ker-
korian is suing DaimlerChrysler over the merger and the subse-
quent decline in the value of his stock. 26 The foundation of Mr.
Kerkorian's legal claims are statements made by Jurgenn
Schrempp that Daimler-Benz actually viewed the transaction
with Chrysler as a takeover of the American company instead of
the merger of equals that they had described to the public. 127
Although commentators say Mr. Kerkorian's lawsuit has a low
probability of success, it is another example of the problems that
have beset DaimlerChrysler since the merger.128
C. VODAFONE'S HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF MANNESMAN
Vodafone's takeover of Mannesmann exemplifies the blur-
ring of European economic borders and the weakening of Ger-
many, Inc.'s ability to insulate domestic companies from compe-
tition inherent in the evolving German economy. If Vodafone's
contentious takeover of Mannesmann is any indication, German
companies will now have to be leery of advances from outside of
German borders. The Vodafone hostile takeover was the first
such acquisition of a large Germany company in recent history,
notable both for its selling price and adversarial nature.
On December 23, 1999, British telecommunications giant
Vodafone made an offer to buy Mannesmann for approximately
123. See id.
124. See Chrysler to Cut 26,000 Jobs: Automaker to Slash Jobs, Idle Plants at
Money-Losing North American Unit (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://cnnfni.cnn.com/2001 O1/29/europe/daimler.
125. See Daimler Takes New Hits: Faces 2 New U.S. Suits and Calls From Ger-
man Critics for Chairman's Removal (Nov. 29, 2000), available at
http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/11/29/companies/daimler/index.htm [hereinafter Law-
suits] (discussing multiple lawsuits filed in early 2001 against DaimlerChrysler re-
lated to the 1998 merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corp. and the subse-
quent fall in share price).
126. See id.
127. See Kerkorian, supra note 63.
128. See id.
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130 billion euros (119 billion U.S. dollars).12 9 The initial offer
was greater than that in any merger in Germany's past, and
grew throughout the course of negotiations. 130 Mannesmann,
under the direction of its CEO, Klaus Esser, quickly rejected
Vodafone's initial offer as inadequate. 131 At the time, Mannes-
mann's recent takeover of Orange, another very large telecom-
munications company and one that Vodafone had hoped to ac-
quire, had triggered Vodafone's overture to Mannesmann. 132
Nearly a month and a half later, on February 4, 2000, Mannes-
mann's management board agreed to a takeover offer, but at a
substantially higher price than Vodafone's first offer. The final
price of the takeover was 181.4 billion euros (165.4 billion U.S.
dollars). 133 Vodafone's offer rose from an initial 240 euros (219
U.S. dollars) per share for Mannesmann to 350.5 euros (320
U.S. dollars) per share. 34 The Vodafone/Mannesmann deal is so
large that it is valued at approximately 50 billion more euros
(45.6 billion U.S. dollars) than the America Online acquisition of
Time-Warner and has created the largest wireless telecommuni-
cations company in the world. 135
One of the usual suspects in German business, Daimler-
Chrysler's CEO, Jurgenn Schrempp, played a key role in Voda-
fone's takeover of Mannesmann. In early February 2000, after
Vodafone had substantially increased its offer for Mannesmann,
Mr. Schrempp reportedly pushed Mannesmann's CEO Esser to
accept Vodafone's offer. 136 Mr. Schrempp exerted his influence
by virtue of being one of the strongest members of Mannes-
mann's supervisory board. 137 During the negotiations Mannes-
mann spokespeople denied to the press that Mr. Schrempp or
any other Mannesmann board members were urging Mr. Esser
to accept Vodafone's offer, but two days later a deal had been
reached. 38
Vodafone's acquisition of Mannesmann through a cross-
border takeover would not have been feasible a few years ago
129. See William Boston, Mannesmann To Put Heat On Vodafone, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Dec. 27, 1999, at 10.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Boston, Naik, & Raghavan, supra note 10.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Neal E. Boudette and Anita Raghavan, Mannesmann Urged to Make Deal,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 2, 2000, at 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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because of protective actions by Germany, Inc. or the German
government against outside acquirers.139 In today's changed
climate, Mr. Schrempp was able to counsel a peer to sell to a
British acquirer. 4 The Vodafone takeover of Mannesmann will
likely help both corporations and their shareholders because of
synergies between the companies.
Mannesmann executives may be the only people who will
not benefit long-term from Vodafone's acquisition of their com-
pany.141 Unlike their American counterparts, German execu-
tives do not have golden parachutes and many of them do not
own substantial stakes in the companies that they run. 42 After
the takeover by Vodafone, Mr. Esser will lose much of the social
prestige and power that came with running one of the largest
German corporations, and he will be out of a job.143 It seems
ironic that a German CEO who will not benefit from a golden
parachute accomplished exactly what most American CEOs
with large buyout clauses would hope to do in the same situa-
tion.
D. DEUTSCHE BANK'S DISASTROUS ATTEMPT To MERGE WITH
DRESDNER BANK
The success of the Vodafone deal was not replicated in the
failed merger attempt between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank. The failed bank merger is a crucial lesson for German
managers, however. It demonstrates that increased competition
in the market and the new economic order will not look favora-
bly upon German managers who cannot complete important
mergers.
In March 2000, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank an-
nounced they would merge, but a month changed negotiations
from terms and conditions to accusations and blame for the
failed attempt.144 Many people, including Chancellor Schroeder,
had hailed the proposed banking merger as a step forward in
the modernization of Germany's Economy. Chancellor Schroe-
der stated, "This merger creates new opportunities for the Ger-
139. See Boudette and Raghavan, supra note 136.
140. See id.
141. See Gautam Naik and Anita Raghavan, In Vodafone Battle, Esser Was Fly-
ing With No Parachute: Mannesmann CEO Had No Incentive to Give Up: Fighting
for Shareholders and for His Job, WALL ST. J EuR., Feb. 7, 2000, at 1.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70.
2002]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
man economy."1 45 Amazingly, Chancellor Schroeder's comments
came after it was announced that the merger would cost 14,000
Germans their jobs. 146
Dresdner Bank stopped the merger because it disagreed
with Deutsche Bank about the fate of Dresdner's profitable
London-based investment banking operation. 147 Deutsche Bank
wanted to sell the London-based investment bank, while
Dresdner Bank hoped to retain it.148 Initially, the Deutsche
Bank's CEO, Rolf Breuer, nicknamed "Mr. Stockmarket" by
some in Germany, 149 called the DKB operation a '"jewel' that
would never be sold."150 After discussions with Deutsche Bank's
heads of investment banking and global markets, Mr. Breuer
decided that Deutsche Bank wanted to sell the London opera-
tion.15 Conversely, Bernhard Walter, Dresdner Bank's CEO,
hoped to keep the London investment banking operation and
cancelled the merger after learning of Mr. Breuer's intentions. 1 2
Deutsche Bank changed its opinion about retaining the DKB in-
vestment bank in part because of the bank's problems integrat-
ing the New York-based Bankers Trust.153 Another factor con-
tributing to the collapse of the merger agreement was Dresdner
Bank's opinion that the combination was a "merger of equals"
while Deutsche Bank's chairman said that approach would have
been "nonsensical".154
The fallout from the aborted German bank merger was al-
most immediate. Chancellor Schroeder said that he had "seen
more mature behavior by companies."155 Within days, Dresdner
Bank's CEO Mr. Walter resigned. 15 6 At the same time, Mr. Wal-
ter was leaving, there was also speculation that Mr. Breuer
would also be forced to exit at Deutsche Bank.' 57 The initial call
for Mr. Breuer's job was surprisingly strong, and something he
145. Christopher Rhoads, Europe Puts Its Faith in Bank Mergers, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Apr. 4, 2000, at 13.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See MEYER-LARSEN, supra note 1, at 90.
150. Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70, at 1.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Quit, supra note 71.
155. Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70, at 1.
156. Quit, supra note 71, at 1.
157. See id.
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had not experienced before.1 18 Criticism of Mr. Breuer included
an editorial in the German newspaper Die Welt that stated, "the
chairman has led his bank into its biggest crisis since the end of
the War," and added that Mr. Breuer had no choice but to step
down. 159 Despite the failed merger, Mr. Breuer has been able to
keep his job, but the glare of the spotlight is increasing on him.
Dresdner Bank immediately became a takeover target after
it called off its merger with Deutsche Bank. During the course
of the merger with Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank lost about
100 bankers in London, which weakened Dresdner's most prof-
itable unit.160 Dresdner Bank was soon trying to stem defec-
tions from its investment banking sector by offering larger bo-
nuses and extra autonomy.161
Allianz, who was to sell its stake in both Dresdner Bank
and Deutsche Bank as part of a merger, also helped to keep
Dresdner as a takeover target. Within a week of the collapsed
merger, Allianz announced that it was still interested in selling
its 21.4 percent interest in Dresdner Bank. 162 Initially, Allianz
also tried to salvage its proposed partnership with Deutsche
Bank's retail banking operation.163 Allianz wanted to salvage its
partnership because of the distribution capabilities with
Deutsche Bank's retail network. The opportunity for Allianz to
gain control of the Deutsche Bank retail network is one of the
primary reasons that Allianz had supported the Deutsche
Bank/Dresdner Bank merger in the first place.164
III. GERMANY FIGHTS BACK: ALLIANZ AS AN
AGGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL ACQUIRER
A. BUSINESS ACTIVITY AT HOME
Although Allianz was not able to force Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank to complete their merger, the situation appears
158. See generally Turmoil, supra note 7173, at 1 (explaining the fallout for
bank executives after the failure of the Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank merger).
159. See Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70, at 1.
160. See Turmoil, supra note 71, at 1.
161. See id.; see also Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70, at 1.
162. Fuhrmans, supra note 22, at 1.
163. See id.
164. See id (discussing the benefits of access to Deutsche Bank's retail network
on Allianz's business).
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to have worked out well for Allianz in the long run. The pe-
riod after the aborted merger between Dresdner Bank and
Deutsche Bank was bleak for both Allianz and Dresdner Bank.
Allianz was unable to find a suitable solution for disposing of its
21.4 percent ownership stake in Dresdner Bank. Dresdner
Bank entered into a second aborted merger attempt, this time
with Commerzbank, which later ended with accusations about
the deal's collapse coming from both sides. 166 The attempted
merger between Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank was called
off after lengthy discussions due to a valuation dispute. 161
Dresdner Bank was not having success finding a merger partner
when fall 2000 rolled around, and Allianz was not happy be-
cause it still held a large ownership interest in the company it
wanted to sell. 6 ' Allianz's attempts to divest its stake in
Dresdner Bank also stagnated because of Dresdner Bank's diffi-
culties finding a proper business partner."'
During its discussions with Deutsche Bank and Commerz-
bank, Dresdner Bank paid large bonuses to keep its key invest-
ment bankers at its subsidiary Dresdner Kleinwort Benson."10
In 2000, Dresdner Bank paid roughly 550 million euros in bo-
nuses to its investment bankers so the would not leave the
bank, after its failed merger attempts. 171 Dresdner Bank could
not let its investment banking subsidiary lose value because it is
112one of its most profitable arms.
Although Dresdner Bank had problems finding a merger
partner in 2000, the bank was not opposed to growth through
acquisition of financial companies. In September 2000,
Dresdner Bank bought the New York based investment banking
165. See Allianz, Dresdner Agree Tie: German Insurer Agrees to Buy Dresdner
Bank for $21 Billion (Apr. 1, 2001), available at http://cgi.cnnfn.cnn.com/
output/pfv/200104/01/Europe/allianzl [hereinafter Agree to Tie].
166. See Kevin Delaney, Anita Raghavan, and Marcus Walker, Allianz-Dresdner
Deal May Spur Others: Birth of Finance Colossus is Expected to Prompt a New Wave
of Mergers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2001, at A17 (discussing Allianz's purchase of
Dresdner Bank and Dresdner's string of prior failed deals).
167. See Allianz-Dresdner Deal Near: Insurer's $19.5 Billion Takeover of Bank
Could Come Next Week, Lead to IPO of DKW (Mar. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Allianz-
Dresdner Deal], available at http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2001/03/29/europe/dresdner/
index.htm (discussing the possibility of an Allianz and Dresdner Bank merger and
Dresdner's earlier aborted attempts to find other partners).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70, at 1; see also Portanger and
Steinborn, supra note 71, at 15.
171. See Allianz-Dresdner Deal, supra note 167.
172. See Portanger and Rhoads, supra note 70.
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firm of Wasserstein, Perella & Co. for approximately 1.4 billion
dollars in an attempt to strengthen its investment banking op-
erations. 173  Dresdner-Kleinwort-Benson became Dresdner
Kleinwort Wasserstein after the takeover. As part of its acqui-
sition of Wasserstein, Perella & Co., Dresdner Bank paid the in-
vestment bankers at Wasserstein, Perella & Co. generously and
signed large contracts so they would not leave, causing a de-
crease in the company value. 174 A key aspect of the Wasser-
stein, Perella & Co. deal was the possibility for Wasserstein,
Perella & Co. executives to make large amounts of money on a
future sale or merger of Dresdner Bank with another com-175 Th Was& eeuis
pany. The Wasserstein, Perella & Co. executives fought to
use Dresdner stock as the "currency" for the purchase of their
investment so as to have a stake in any future acquisition of
Dresdner Bank.
176
Wasserstein, Perella & Co's executives are now much
wealthier because Allianz will purchase Dresdner Bank. 77 On
April 2, 2001, Allianz announced that it was buying Dresdner
Bank and merging with the bank. 78 The purchase price was
stated as nearly 21 billion euros in cash and stock.1 79 The pro-
posed Allianz-Dresdner merger is the first of impending consoli-
dations between large German corporations, creating the Ger-
man equivalent of Citigroup. Allianz's purchase of Dresdner is
the first of what may be many future alliances between mem-
bers of the German banking and insurance industries as finan-
173. See Luisa Beltran, Dresdner Deal Nearly Done: Merger between German
Bank and Wasserstein Perella Expected Monday (Sept. 15, 2000), available at
http:/cgi.cnnfn.com/output/pfv/2000/09/15/deals/dresdner/; see also Dresdner Buys
Wasserstein: German Bank to Pay $1.4 Billion Stock for New York Investment Firm,
$190 Million to Keep Staff (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://cgi.cnnfn.com/outpur/
pfv/2000/09/18/deals/dresdner wasserstein [hereinafter Keep Staff]; see also,
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Combination of Dresdner Kleinwort Benson with
Wasserstein Perella Strengthens Dresdner Bank's Investment Banking Activities,
available at http://www.wasserella.com/press-releases/pr200009l8-1.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 19, 2001).
174. See Keep Staff, supra note 173.
175. See generally Allianz-Dresdner Deal, supra note 167.
176. See id.
177. See Marcus Walker, Deals for Dresdner Won't Satisfy an Acquisitive Al-
lianz: German Insurer Now to Play Catch-Up in U.S: Keep an Eye on U.K and Asia,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2001, at A16; see also Delaney, Raghavan, and Walker, supra
note 166.
178. See Delaney, Raghavan, and Walker, supra note 166, at A17 (discussing
Allianz's purchase of Dresdner Bank for nearly 25 billion euros); see also Agree to
Tie, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
179. See Delaney, Raghavan, and Walker, supra note 166, at A17.
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cial institutions attempt to take advantage of the economies of
scale that accompany this type of combination.180 Allianz and
Dresdner Bank will now cross-sell products to clients more eas-
ily.
The combination of Allianz and Dresdner Bank boasts 23
million customers in Germany alone.' 8 ' Dresdner Bank's recent
record of not closing deals within the last year makes commen-
tators leery, but they should be confident considering the situa-
tion. The mechanics of Allianz's purchase of Dresdner Bank are
different than the deals that were not completed with Deutsche
Bank and Commerzbank.
Allianz is in control of the acquisition of Dresdner Bank be-
cause it is also a huge shareholder of Dresdner Bank with its
21.4 percent stake in the German Bank.182 The merger between
Allianz and Dresdner Bank would force other German financial
institutions to change the way they do business because of its
alignment between the banking and insurance industries.
The Merger creates two towering German financial networks
with a global reach, Allianz-Dresdner and Deutsche Bank.'
The Allianz-Dresdner Bank combination moves ahead of
Deutsche Bank in size with a market capitalization, at the time
of the merger announcement, of approximately 110 billion euros,
or roughly twice that of Deutsche Bank. 8' In this transaction,
Allianz was not granting its assent or trying to mold a combina-
tion of Dresdner Bank with another third party, but it is a two
party transaction.
It is true that there are smaller minority shareholders who
need to be satisfied to complete the merger, but Allianz has al-
ready made steps to placate them and in doing so has started to
unravel Germany, Inc. 8 6 As part of the transaction, Allianz
agreed to swap its stake in HypoVereinsbank AG, the second
largest bank in Germany, 181 to Munich Re in exchange for Mu-
nich Re's four percent ownership stake in Allianz. 88 Allianz's
180. See generally Allianz-Dresdner Deal, supra note 167.
181. See Walker, supra note 177, at 18.
182. See Rhoads, supra note 15, at A24.
183. See Delaney, Raghavan, and Walker, supra note 166, at A17.
184. See Anita Raghavan and Marcus Walker, Allianz is In Talks To Buy
Dresdner Bank: German Insurance Giant Would Pay $19.5 Billion In Stock And
Cash Deal, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 29, 2001, at A3 & A8.
185. See Delaney, Raghavan, and Walker, supra note 166.
186. See Raghavan and Walker, supra note 184; see also Delaney, Raghavan,
and Walker, supra note 166 (analyzing the mechanics of the recent merger).
187. See Raghavan and Walker, supra note 184, at A3.
188. See id.
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share exchange with Munich Re will also serve to strengthen
the relationship between Munich Re and HypoVereinsbank AG
as German banks and insurance companies try to combine to
form large one-stop financial institutions, much like the Citi-
group model.'89 Allianz's purchase of Dresdner Bank assures
the German insurer a strong, lasting banking partner and posi-
tions the insurer to take advantage of the impending explosion
of Germany's private pension market.9 °
If Allianz had waited too long, all of the quality members of
the German banking industry might have had partners and Al-
lianz would have been left without a retail distribution network.
Instead, Allianz was able to pick its partner. One of the ques-
tions that remains is who Deutsche Bank will combine with to
grow its non-banking operations. If no possible German insur-
ers remain, Deutsche Bank might be forced to combine with an
American or French insurance giant such as Axa. 191 Deutsche
Bank may also be apprehensive about new acquisitions after its
problems integrating Banker's Trust and its failed merger at-
tempt with Dresdner Bank, but Deutsche Bank must find a
partner soon or it will lose market share. 192 In the fall of 2000,
Deutsche Bank announced that it was not looking to purchase
an investment banking operation in an attempt to strengthen
its mergers and acquisitions practice, even though Deutsche
Bank is a leading player in this lucrative area. 93 Deutsche
Bank recently signaled that it is working towards listing its
stock on the NYSE and using those shares to pay for new acqui-
sitions in the United States. 194 In fact, on October 3, 2001,
Deutsche Bank listed its global shares on the NYSE.'9
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Tony Major, Deutsche Bank Seeking Partners and Takeovers, FIN. TIMES
(May 18, 2001), available at http://globalorc... /articles.html?id=0105180011178
query=deutsche+bank+sells+allianz+stak; see also Tony Major and Alison Beard,
Deutsche Bank Close To Winning U.S. Listing, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2001), available
at http'//globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?
id=010813001194&query=deutsche+bank+close+to+winning+us+listing.
195. Deutsche Bank's Share on Wall Street, available at http://ircontent.db.com/
i/.nyse/main e.php (last visited October 15, 2001) (discussing the listing of Deutsche
Bank shares on the NYSE for the first time on October 3, 2001); see also Tony Major,
Deutsche Bank Lists in U.S., FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2001), available at
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=011003002018&query=deut
sche+bank+and+tony+major.
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B. INCREASING MARKET SHARE ABROAD: ALLIANZ'S UNITED
STATES ACQUISITIONS
1. An Ambitious Plan
Allianz has signaled it is actively looking in the United
States for quality acquisitions in both life insurance and the as-
set management area.196 Allianz is currently the fifty-first
ranked life insurance company in the United States by size, and
the company's goal is to be a top five company in every mar-
ket.197 In a statement posted on the company's web site, Allianz
management board member Helmut Perlet stated, "We have al-
ready said for a long time that we wanted to build up our U.S.
position. That is especially true for the life insurance-business
there. 1 98
Allianz must buy a large United States based life insurance
company if it is to reach its goal in the United States. Allianz
cannot simply go from fifty-first to fifth by increasing the
strength of its current businesses. In addition, no other member
of Germany, Inc. stands to benefit as much as Allianz from the
corporate capital gains repeal in 2002.199 If Allianz has good
execution in selling its stakes in Germany, Inc. it will provide
the insurer with a very large cash infusion, because of its status
as the linchpin of Germany, Inc. and its estimated 120 billion
euros (at the end of 2000) in holdings. 20 0
2. Current Market Share in the United States
German insurance giants Allianz and Munich Re are estab-
196. See Allianz Net Grows 12%; Firm Predicts Stronger 2001: German Insurer
Turns Focus to Expanding U.S. Presence, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 15, 2001, at 18
[hereinafter Strong 2001] (discussing Allianz's profits in 2000 and its focus on
growth in the United States); see also Walker, supra note 177, at A16; see also
Schulte-Nolte, Dr. Henning, Allianz AG: Speech by the Chairman of the Board of
Management, available at http://www.allianz.com/us-listingf3-02d.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2001) (explaining the final fiscal figures for 1999 and the outlook for Al-
lianz in 2000 and its expansion plans throughout the world); see also About Us,
available at http://www.allianz.comVx/cdalO,,519-44,00.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2001) (Allianz's annual report available online for the period ending June 30, 2000).
197. See Strong 2001, supra note 196; see also Walker, supra note 177.
198. Strong 2001, supra note 196.
199. See Walker, supra note 177.
200. See generally Vanessa Fuhrmans and Marcus Walker, Paul Achleitner Dis-
covers Untangling Allianz Isn't Easy: Dresdner Disappointment May Alter Expecta-
tions for the Star Banker, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2000, at A8.
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lishing a corporate presence in the United States by acquiring
companies and moving toward being listed on United States
stock markets.201 Allianz has long had a small North American
subsidiary based in Minneapolis, Allianz Life Company of North
America was founded in 1896,202 but the insurance juggernaut
has only recently begun to extend its empire within the United
States. Eleven years ago, Allianz bought Fireman's Fund In-
surance Co. for 1.1 billion dollars. 20 3 Allianz had been slow in
acquiring other United States corporations in the period be-
tween its Fireman's Fund purchase and 1999. In the Spring of
1999, Allianz purchased Life USA, an insurance holding com-
pany for a substantial premium over Life USA's share price on
the NASDAQ. 20 4 Allianz paid more than double the premium
for Life USA's stock that had languished around eleven dollars a
share for many years.20 5 Allianz paid more than twenty dollars
a share for the seventy-five percent of Life USA that it did not
already own because Allianz wanted Life USA's strong sales
network of independent agents.20 6
Since buying Life USA, Allianz also acquired the PIMCO
mutual funds family for 3.3 billion dollars in hopes of increasing
Allianz's exposure to the lucrative asset management busi-
ness.20 7  A year later, Allianz also purchased the San Diego
based Nicholas-Applegate family of mutual funds for approxi-
mately 2 billion dollars. 208 After the Nicholas Applegate acquisi-
tion, Allianz had approximately 740 billion euros (675 billion
201. See Strong 2001, supra note 196; see also See Jesse Eisinger, Heard in
Europe: Rival Munich Re Learns and Gains From Allianz, WALL ST. J. EUR., Mar. 6,
2000, at 13.
202. See Report of Target Market Conduct Examination of Allianz Life Insurance
Company of North America Minneapolis, Minnesota (visited on Oct. 22, 2001), at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/tableofcontents/orders/marketconduct/Allianz%20Life
%20of%2ONorth%2OAmerica%2OReport.htm.
203. See Aeppel and Garcia, supra note 76.
204. Allianz AG: Unit Reaches Deal to Buy Rest of Life USA Holding, WALL ST.
J., May 18, 1999, at C15.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Vanessa Fuhrmans and Pui-Wing Tam, Allianz Agrees To Buy Stake In
U.S.'s Pimco, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at Cl; see also Allianz Buys Pimco Stake:
German Insurer Takes 70% of U.S. Fund Manager for $3.3 Billion (Nov. 1, 1999),
available at http://cnnfn.cnn.com/1999/1l/01/worldbiz/allianz/ (examining Allianz's
purchase of the 70 percent of Pimco that it did not already own).
208. See Allianz Completes Acquisition of Nicholas-Applegate, available at
http://www.allianz-vermoegen.de/jslvermoegen.2/unternehmen/presse/010201_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2001) (discussing briefly about the Allianz's purchase of Nicho-
las-Applegate).
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U.S. dollars) under management, up from approximately 250
billion euros (228 billion U.S. dollars) before the PIMCO and
Nicholas-Applegate acquisitions. 20 9
Now Allianz has joined DaimlerChrysler in the United
States. Allianz listed its stock on the NYSE through an Ameri-
can Depository Receipt ("ADR") on November 3, 2000.210 Al-
lianz's listing on the NYSE shows that the company is serious
about expanding its presence in the United States through ac-
quisitions. There have also been signals that Munich Re, of
which Allianz owns a 25 percent stake, has plans to follow Al-
lianz's lead and obtain an NYSE listing for its stock in the near
future.211
3. A Unifying Strategy
Although Allianz's purchase of Dresdner Bank is a much
larger transaction than Allianz's purchase of Life USA, both
takeovers bear surprising similarities. Allianz was the largest
minority shareholder in both corporations. One of the driving
reasons behind Allianz's purchase in both instances was the dis-
tribution systems of the respective companies. Life USA had a
strong network of independent agents throughout the United
States who could be used as a conduit to funnel Allianz prod-
ucts. Dresdner Bank has a large retail banking operation that
Allianz will be able to cross-sell to millions of Dresdner Bank
clients. 212 Allianz had been unable to come to an agreement
with Deutsche Bank about selling Allianz products in Deutsche
Bank retail offices. Without a cross-selling agreement with
Deutsche Bank, Allianz needed a new way to distribute its in-
creasing array of financial products, including mutual funds and
private pension products, to the German public at a retail
level. 213 The merger would also give Allianz an opportunity to
sell its products to thousands of Dresdner Bank's corporate cus-
tomers and make those clients of Allianz's corporate pension
209. See id.; see also Allianz Eyeing Applegate: Other Bidders for Fund Manager
Said to Include AIG, Nuveen and First Union (Sept. 18, 2000), available at
http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/09/18/deals/applegate/index.htm.
210. See Allianz AG (NYSE-Listed AZ) Lists on the NYSE: To Celebrate, Dr.
Henning Schulte-Noelle, Chairman of the Board, Rings the Opening Bell, available
at http'//www.nyse.com/events/NT0007EDFA.html, (last visited Sept. 16, 2001).
211. See id.
212. See Raghavan and Walker, supra note 184, at A3.
213. See id
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business. 214 Donald Moore, chairman of Morgan Stanley Group
Europe, was quoted as saying, "this is about products, custom-
ers and distribution."215 Mr. Moore continued that the merger is
an indication that corporate Germany is moving away from its
longstanding tradition of cross-ownership. 216
C. A SLOWER MOVE To THE UNITED STATES: MUNICH RE
Munich Re is also making moves to expose itself to the
American market in an attempt, albeit slower than Allianz, to
capitalize on the impending capital gains tax reform in Ger-
many.217 Munich Re switched accounting methods to the more
accepted International Accounting Standards that are closer to
the American Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
in its preparation for a future listing on the NYSE. 218 Munich
Re is also reported to have approximately 47 billion euros in
capital, with 18 billion euros considered "excess" capital.219
IV. THE FUTURE?
Germany is in the midst of a great and exciting economic
time as it enters the twenty-first century. Germany, Inc. is
breaking up and the German government has been surprisingly
willing to help this change by repealing the excessive fifty per-
cent corporate capital gains tax on corporate shareholdings.220
Within German borders, Germany, Inc. is losing its grip
over the country's economy, yet the same German corporations
may now become larger players in the global economy. Ger-
many, Inc.'s transition will likely continue to gain speed in the
near future, increasing its acceleration once the corporate capi-
tal gains tax repeal takes effect in early 2002.
Individual corporate transactions highlight the economic
transformation occurring in Germany. Daimler-Benz started
the transition in 1993 when it listed it securities on the NYSE,
and since then the momentum has been slowly increasing. Al-
lianz's recent acquisitions of Life USA, PIMCO funds, and
Nicholas Applegate in the United States show that the insur-
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See Eisinger, supra note 201.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Fuhrmans, supra note 9, at 11.
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ance giant is readying itself to buy companies in the United
States. Allianz's status in corporate America will increase as it
moves to become a top five life insurance and financial company
in the United States in terms of size. Munich Re has also moved
forward by changing its accounting standards to more closely
resemble GAAP in an attempt to ready itself for a listing on the
NYSE. Deutsche Bank created a subsidiary in late 1998 to hold
all of its outside industrial holdings and the bank sold some of
its stake in Allianz in late 1999.
Germany, Inc.'s increased merger activity also demon-
strates that dramatic change is looming in the horizon. In early
2000, after Chancellor Schroeder announced his corporate tax
reform proposal, the merger activity among Germany, Inc. cor-
porations began to pickup steam. Daimler-Benz led the way
with its groundbreaking merger with Chrysler Corporation in
Spring 1998. Deutsche Bank soon followed the DaimlerChrysler
deal with its acquisition of Bankers Trust for 9.2 billion dollars.
British-based Vodafone acquired Mannesmann in the largest
merger ever, approximately 180 billion euros (164 billion U.S.
dollars).
Once the corporate tax reform becomes law in 2002, the
large German corporate world will be full of activity as the
members of Germany, Inc. divest themselves of their cross-
holdings.221 If the euro rebounds and becomes stronger against
the dollar, German companies should buy corporations in the
United States and abroad. On the other hand, if the euro con-
tinues to be weak against the dollar and British pound, both
British and American companies and buyout firms will look to
Germany because of its good values and depressed currency.
American and British companies have attempted to acquire
their German counterparts because of the typically strong capi-
tal reserves of German companies, their well-respected man-
agement teams, and the low book values. The possibility of ac-
quisitions, hostile takeovers, and establishing a corporate
presence in the United States will make the future exciting for
large corporations in Germany.
221. See Rhoads, supra note 4, at 1; see also Rhoads, supra note 15, at A24.
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